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ABSTRACT 
Extreme weather events represent the earliest, and in some places most significant, threats 
to the most vulnerable countries that are driven by climate change. An outcome of the 16th 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP16) to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Cancún was the decision to establish a work 
programme to consider approaches to address loss and damage associated with climate 
change impacts in the most vulnerable countries, including the adverse impacts of extreme 
weather events. This represents a significant opportunity to consider in more detail the 
feasibility and design aspects of current proposals on loss and damage, and undertake 
activities to develop a menu of viable measures and practical implementation options to 
inform discussions at COP18 in 2012. We conclude that there is already significant expertise 
and knowledge available on loss and damage that will form important inputs to these 
activities. However, there are also many open questions, particularly on approaches for 
operationalising a loss and damage mechanism. We identify high priority open questions 
about the design, implementation and governance of such a mechanism. We suggest that a 
valuable activity of the work programme would be to address such open questions with a 
view to informing recommendations by the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI) to COP18. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Cancún Adaptation Framework2, an outcome of the 16th session of the Conference of 
the Parties (COP16) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), highlights the need to strengthen international cooperation and expertise to 
understand and reduce loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate 
change2. Extreme weather events, such as droughts, floods and storms, which are the focus 
of this paper, are recognised as a key driver of this potential loss and damage, alongside 
                                                 
1
 This paper builds on the submission made by the Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change 
and the Environment and the Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy on 21
st
 February 2011. 
2
 Contained in /CP.16 (UNFCCC/AWGLCA/2010/L.7), paragraphs 25-29, 
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf 
                                                                                         
slow-onset events, such as sea level rise, desertification and increasing average 
temperatures.  
 
Today, extreme weather events cause devastating loss of lives and livelihoods across the 
world. The effects of disasters are felt particularly strongly in developing countries; roughly 
90 per cent of deaths from disasters occur in the developing world3. According to estimates 
from the global reinsurer Munich Re, since 1980, weather catastrophes have caused almost 
1,200,000 fatalities and led to direct damages amounting to US$610 billion in low and lower 
middle income countries4 (Figure 1). These disasters also have long-run negative impacts on 
development, for example, by damaging natural capital and infrastructure, undermining 
economic development and setting back poverty reduction efforts5. Climate change is likely 
to affect the frequency, intensity and geographical distribution of extreme weather events 
and in some areas this will lead to greater risks. Stern (2007) highlighted that extreme 
weather events represent the earliest and, in places most significant, threats to the most 
vulnerable populations that are driven by climate change. The World Development Report 
2010 emphasised that unless the impacts of disasters can be systematically reduced, past 
development gains will be at risk6. 
 
*in 2010 values
66%8%
23%
3%
8%
9%
28%55%
Overall losses* US$2,310bn Fatalities 1,400,000
High income economies 
(GNI > 12,195 US$)
Upper middle income economies
(GNI 3,946 – 12,195 US$) 
Lower middle income economies 
(GNI 996 – 3,945 US$) 
Low  income economies 
(GNI < 996 US$)
Income Groups 2010 (defined by World Bank):
 
Figure 1: Fatalities and overall losses from global weather catastrophes by World Bank (as of 2010) 
income group between 1980 and 2010. Source: the Munich Re NatCatSERVICE database
7
 
 
Even if efforts to mitigate climate change, by reducing greenhouse gas emissions, are 
successful, the world is committed to some further warming which means that people across 
the world will need to adapt to increasing impacts of climate change. The reduction and 
management of the risks from extreme weather events must play a major part in adaptation 
strategies and financing. 
 
                                                 
3
 Hoeppe and Gurenko (2006). 
4
 Low and lower middle income countries are defined as those countries with a gross national annual 
income per capita of less than US$3,946 in 2010. 
5
 UNISDR (2009). 
6
 World Bank (2009). 
7
 2011 Münchener Rückversicherungs-Gesellschaft, Geo Risks Research, NatCatSERVICE (as at April 
2011) 
                                                                                         
Several proposals have been made by Parties to the UNFCCC and organisations about 
mechanisms to address loss and damage within an international adaptation framework 
(hereafter, a loss and damage mechanism). An outcome of the 16th session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP16) in Cancún was the decision to establish a work 
programme in order to consider these approaches and to request that the Subsidiary Body 
for Implementation (SBI) agree the activities to be undertaken under this work programme. 
This represents a significant opportunity to consider in more detail the feasibility and design 
aspects of current proposals on loss and damage, and undertake activities to develop a 
menu of viable measures and practical implementation options to inform discussions at 
COP18 in 2012. 
 
This paper responds to the call by the UNFCCC8 following Cancún for relevant organisations 
to “submit views and information on what elements should be included in the work 
programme, specifically related to: 
a) Possible development of a climate risk insurance facility to address impacts 
associated with severe weather events; 
b) Options for risk management and risk reduction; risk sharing and transfer 
mechanisms such as insurance, including options for micro-insurance; and resilience 
building, including economic diversification; 
c) Approaches for addressing rehabilitation associated with slow onset events; 
d) Engagement of stakeholders with relevant specialized expertise.” 
 
This paper aims to provide input on the important gaps in current understanding that could 
be addressed by the SBI work programme on loss and damage in order to inform 
recommendations by the SBI to COP18. This paper addresses parts (a), (b) and (d) listed 
above, which are each associated with managing risks from extreme weather9. The following 
section provides a discussion of the tools that are available to manage loss and damage 
associated with severe weather events, and of the lessons learnt and principles that could be 
relevant inputs to a work programme on loss and damage. Section III reviews the current 
proposals made by Parties and organisations for a loss and damage mechanism. Section IV 
provides suggestions on elements of an SBI work programme on loss and damage, starting 
from its desired outcomes and outputs, and working towards a definition of the required 
inputs and activities. Section V focuses on important knowledge gaps around one input, 
approaches to operationalising risk management options, and lists high priority open 
questions that should be addressed by the work programme.  
 
                                                 
8
 Outlined in paragraph 28 of /CP.16 and subsequent message to Parties on 12
th
 January 2011. 
9
 Part (c) is not directly addressed in this paper as it goes beyond managing extreme events and 
requires a different set of tools and policies. 
                                                                                         
II. BACKGROUND: OPTIONS FOR MANAGING LOSS AND DAMAGE ASSOCIATED WITH SEVERE WEATHER 
EVENTS 
 
There is a deep knowledge and experience available to the SBI work programme on loss and 
damage regarding approaches to managing risks from severe weather events. This section 
provides a brief summary of the array of tools available and lessons learnt about how these 
tools can be applied together to reduce risks within an adaptation framework.  
 
The array of tools available can be divided into ex-ante and ex-post categories. Ex-ante 
measures are implemented before a disaster occurs. These include:  
• Tackling the underlying social drivers of risk, for example, poverty reduction and 
development, including strengthening governance and institutional structures, 
economic diversification, improving health care, access to social protection and 
education10. 
• Early warning systems and disaster preparedness, including monitoring and 
forecasting, evacuation procedures and emergency response planning. 
• Structural and non-structural measures to limit physical risks (also known as risk 
prevention and reduction), such as flood defences, enforced building codes and land-
use planning. 
• Measures to enhance financial resilience, including financial risk-sharing (insurance). 
These types of measures are appropriate for managing different scales of risk and so are 
often complementary within a risk management strategy (Figure 1). For example, measures, 
such as sea walls, can significantly reduce risks from more frequent, smaller-scale extreme 
weather events, but can not substantially limit the consequences of rarer, more severe and 
large-scale disasters which can often overwhelm them. For these disasters, preparedness 
coupled with financial resilience can be a cost-effective way to limit impacts on people and 
the economy, and to speed recovery. 
 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of available ex-ante risk management tools and their applicability for managing 
different scales of risk, in terms of severity and frequency (Source: Warner and Spiegel 2009) 
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 World Bank (2009). 
                                                                                         
 
Ex-post measures are implemented after a disaster occurs, and include: disaster response; 
humanitarian assistance; reconstruction; and rehabilitation. Historically, low- and middle-
income countries have tended to rely on ex-post measures, in particular, post-disaster 
assistance, rather than measures to increase resilience before a disaster strikes. There are 
several reasons for this. The advantage of post-disaster assistance over ex-ante action is that 
the latter draws on local public/private finances for investments (with uncertain benefits), 
whereas post-disaster assistance is financed upfront by external groups (e.g. aid or lending 
donor countries) and is reactive (i.e. requires no forward planning). Also it is specifically 
targeted at the affected group. 
 
The major disadvantage of post-disaster assistance is that it does not prevent fatalities or 
damages. The reliance on aid can also cause ‘charity hazard’, where the expectation of help 
after an event can discourage countries and individuals to take preventative measures, 
potentially putting more lives and livelihoods at risk. The United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction (2009) notes: “The traditional model of post-disaster 
financing, relying on slow and unreliable assistance from the international community, the 
diversion of budget allocations from development to recovery, or raising new debt in 
expensive post-disaster capital markets, is increasingly inefficient as disaster occurrence and 
the magnitude of loss increase”. International assistance often offsets less than 10 per cent 
of the losses caused by a disaster, and reconstruction funding may take up to 12 months or 
more to put into action, even if it is allocated effectively to help those most affected11. 
 
For these reasons, enhanced ex-ante risk management can have huge and immediate 
benefits in developing countries. In the majority of cases, ex-ante disaster risk reduction is a 
far more cost-effective, sustainable and humanitarian approach to managing risks than 
simply bearing the losses or relying on ex-post measures. For example, one global study 
estimates that US$1 invested in pre-disaster risk management activities in developing 
countries can prevent US$7 in losses12. There are also many examples of cost-benefits at a 
local level. For example, it has been estimated that between 1960 and 2000, China spent 
US$3.15 billion on flood control, averting potential losses of US$12 billion, and in India, 
disaster risk management and preparedness programmes in Andhra Pradesh yielded a 
benefit/cost ratio of more than 1313. Ashdown (2011) reported that Mozambique 
unsuccessfully requested £2 million in 2006 from the international community to help 
prepare for floods, but in 2007 the international community spent £60 million on responding 
to floods in the country. That is not to say that ex-ante investments in flood preparedness 
would have avoided the need for all of the £60 million expenditure on post-disaster aid, but 
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 ISDR (2009). 
12
 Cited in UNDP (2007). 
13
 Cited in Stern (2007). 
                                                                                         
it is likely that it would have reduced the suffering of some of the almost 300,000 people 
affected by the floods. 
Rationale for Risk Transfer Tools, such as Insurance, and their Limitations 
 
Not all of the risks from extreme weather events can be eliminated cost-effectively; there 
will always be some residual risks. For instance, it may not be economically or technically 
feasible to build a flood defence that is high enough to protect against, say, a storm surge 
with a 500-year return period. The impacts arising from this residual risk can be reduced 
through better preparedness and disaster response, but in many cases, households, 
businesses and governments are left with a resource gap in rehabilitation and rebuilding that 
can slow recovery and may impair the long-term health, human development and 
productivity of the most vulnerable, exacerbating chronic poverty14. 
 
For many smaller countries, the magnitude of potential disaster losses can be comparable 
to, or greater than, the size of their economic output, making them highly vulnerable 
financially (e.g. Figure 3). For example, Hurricane Ivan caused damages in Grenada that was 
equivalent to 200 per cent of the country’s GDP15. Having immediate funds to jump-start 
rehabilitation and recovery reduces the derailing effect of disasters on development.  
 
 
Figure 3:  The financial vulnerability of selected countries to floods, droughts and storms. For 
example, for countries shaded light orange (like India) a severe weather event with a 70 – 97-year 
return period would exceed the public sector’s financial ability to restore damaged infrastructure and 
provide relief while continuing with development as planned. Note that the analyses cover only 
countries at substantial risk and with available data (i.e. those shown in beige are not covered). 
Source: Mechler et al. (2009).  
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 For example, affected populations may be forced to cut back on more productive investments to 
fund rehabilitation (World Bank 2009). 
15
 World Bank (2009). 
                                                                                         
The resource gap can be closed pro-actively through risk-sharing and transfer, including 
social safety nets and insurance. Here the term ‘insurance’ is used as a collective term that 
covers a range of risk transfer tools appropriate for different users and circumstances, 
including regional risk pooling, sovereign catastrophe bonds, state insurance schemes, 
traditional insurance, micro-insurance and public-private partnerships16. Insurance is a 
mechanism whereby an individual or organisation (the insured) transfers part of their risk to 
an insurer in return for a payment (the premium); if the insured experiences a loss, the 
insurer pays out a previously agreed amount. 
 
Insurance is a tool specifically highlighted by the Cancún Adaptation Framework (Paragraph 
28(a) and (b) of /CP.16). For this reason, this sub-section describes its benefits and 
limitations, and applications in an adaptation context, based on lessons learnt from its use 
today. 
 
Well-functioning insurance markets can have significant benefits for the insured; by sharing 
risks across individuals, regions and countries, they can reduce the negative welfare effects 
of shocks of all types on the affected population. The advantage of ex-ante insurance over 
post-disaster assistance is that it is relatively fast to respond, reliable and the payouts are 
certain17. 
 
Insurance is a form of risk transfer common in developed countries with a growing 
application in the developing world, for example: 
• Micro-insurance schemes, which are specifically designed to be affordable and 
appropriate for low-income groups (although still largely as pilot projects), are 
operating successfully in many parts of Asia and Africa, including India, Mongolia, 
Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda and Tanzania18. MicroEnsure, a leading UK-based micro-
insurance agency (with the assistance of a US$24 million grant from the Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation), has been working with intergovernmental and local 
partners across the world to provide 3,500,000 low-income families with access to a 
range of life, health and (to a lesser extent) weather insurance products across 
Africa and Asia19. For low-income communities, access to micro-insurance can also 
unlock rural credit for farm inputs, such as drought-resistant seeds, which not only 
help farmers to become more resilient, but also provide higher crop yields and 
improve food security. 
• At the other end of the scale, catastrophe risk transfer products are being used by 
governments to reduce the public resource gap for rehabilitation and 
redevelopment after a disaster occurs. These types of products typically cover the 
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 e.g. UNFCCC (2008); Warner and Spiegel (2009). 
17
 Hoeppe and Gurenko (2006). 
18
 Hellmuth et al. (2009). 
19
 Richard Leftley pers. comm. 
                                                                                         
risks of less frequent but higher impact events. The most significant example of this 
is in the Caribbean, where a number of small island states have created a regional 
insurance pool (the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility - CCRIF) to cover 
potential sovereign catastrophic losses from hurricanes and earthquakes20. Risk 
pooling allows those who are exposed to share responsibility for dealing with the 
consequences of disasters. Through spreading risk, pooling allows participants to 
gain catastrophe insurance on better terms and to access collective reserves in the 
event of a disaster. The CCRIF was able to secure more than US$100 million of 
reinsurance capacity in addition to its own reserves21. Index-linked securities, most 
commonly catastrophe bonds, are another option being used by some governments 
to share risks more broadly with the capital markets22. 
 
However, insurance is not a ‘silver bullet’ and has limitations as an adaptation tool. This has 
implications for the design of a loss and damage programme: 
• Fundamentally, risk transfer and risk-sharing schemes do not directly reduce the risk 
of damage or loss from disasters. Ex-ante disaster risk reduction is the only approach 
that can prevent fatalities and limit direct damage from disasters. In a warming 
world, without efforts to reduce risks, both post-disaster assistance and insurance 
will become increasingly expensive and ultimately unsustainable. 
• Like post-disaster assistance, poorly designed risk transfer initiatives can be a 
maladaptation to climate change if they reduce incentives for risk reduction or 
create moral hazard. Conversely, well designed risk transfer schemes can incentivise 
risk reduction efforts and promote a greater focus on resilience. 
• Insurance alone, particularly its traditional form, is not practical or viable 
everywhere; there are barriers to, and practical constraints on, its adoption on a 
scale that might make other tools more effective. In a developing country context, 
these barriers and practical constraints include lack of affordability of insurance, low 
level of risk information (lack of data), constraints caused by local cultural and risk 
knowledge factors (e.g. some cultures have little experience of insurance or have 
values that prevent use of insurance), lack of local skills and capacity for insurance, 
local legislative structures, lack of appropriate distribution networks and moral 
hazard issues. Innovative insurance tools, such as micro-insurance, have overcome 
such issues in some contexts. 
Many of these limitations can be overcome by implementing insurance as one component of 
an integrated risk management approach, which draws on an appropriate balance (or 
‘optimal’ combination) of disaster preparedness, risk reduction, risk transfer, and ex-post 
measures. The appropriate balance is country-specific and dependent on local risk appetite 
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 Ghesquiere et al. (2006). 
21
 Warner et al. (2009). 
22
 Cummins and Mahul (2009). 
                                                                                         
and societal values. This argues for country-led risk management plans, supported by 
technical assistance, risk analyses and capacity-building as necessary. 
 
Implications for the Design of a Loss and Damage Mechanism 
 
The evidence described in this section leads to a number of necessary principles that have 
direct implications for the design of both local adaptation programmes and a potential 
international mechanism for managing loss and damage associated with the adverse impacts 
of climate change under the Cancún Adaptation Framework. 
 
Firstly, there must be an appropriate balance of risk reduction and risk transfer measures 
that recognises the changing nature of risks over time. Secondly, risk transfer mechanisms 
should be designed to incentivise good risk management behaviour. In general, the design of 
a loss and damage mechanism should be founded upon the lessons learnt from initiatives to 
reduce and transfer risks in the current climate, both in developed and developing countries. 
There is no single tool that can effectively reduce all types of risk; a combination is required. 
In addition, there is no ‘one size fits all’ risk management plan; the ‘optimal’ combination 
will depend on the local conditions, such as geography, historical risk governance, attitudes 
to risk and cultural dimensions. 
 
A loss and damage mechanism should also recognise the lessons and principles learnt from 
disaster risk management and development activities today, for example, those outlined in 
the Hyogo Framework for Action (Box 1). In particular, the need to mainstream efforts into 
existing national planning and policy-making processes, including development planning, 
poverty alleviation, environmental management and natural resource management. It 
should also build on the principles laid out by the UNFCCC and the Cancún Adaptation 
Framework, including being country-driven and participatory, promoting local capacity-
building and resilience, and targeting assistance to the most vulnerable groups. 
 
Box 1: The five “Priorities for Action” of the Hyogo Framework for Action 
 
1. Ensure that disaster risk reduction is a national and local priority with a strong institutional 
basis for implementation. 
2. Identify, assess and monitor disaster risks and enhance early warning. 
3. Use knowledge, innovation and education to build a culture of safety and resilience at all 
levels. 
4. Reduce the underlying risk factors. 
5. Strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels. 
 
Source: UNISDR (2005; 2009) 
 
III. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR A LOSS AND DAMAGE MECHANISM IN THE UNFCCC PROCESS 
 
                                                                                         
Numerous proposals for disaster risk reduction and insurance instruments have been put 
forward and have been considered in the UNFCCC negotiation process23. In 2008, the Swiss 
Government reinforced earlier calls by proposing a multi-lateral adaptation fund that would 
be spent on prevention and insurance. Building on this initiative, the Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) and the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) submitted two separate 
but similar proposals on disaster risk reduction and insurance mechanisms24. Both propose 
that the international community makes funding available to assist developing countries, 
particularly those that are most vulnerable, to adapt to climate change, by reducing climate-
related risks and transferring them where necessary through financial mechanisms. 
 
The Proposal of the Munich Climate Insurance Initiative (MCII) 
 
The MCII proposal incorporates two pillars (Figure 4). The Prevention Pillar provides support 
for activities that cost-effectively prevent or reduce low-level weather-related risks from, for 
example, frequently occurring dry seasons or heavy rains. The Insurance Pillar covers those 
risks that can not be cost-effectively prevented, described as medium- and high-level 
weather-related risks. MCII proposes two tiers to deal with these risks. At medium levels of 
risk (e.g. from 1-in-50-year return period events) a Climate Insurance Assistance Facility 
would enable public or private insurance and other social protection systems for vulnerable 
communities. This might include, for example, micro-insurance for agriculture or risk pooling 
for countries. To provide a financial safety net to safeguard against the less frequent and 
higher impact events, MCII proposes a Climate Insurance Pool that will absorb a pre-defined 
portion of high-level risks, particularly in vulnerable countries, at no cost to the beneficiary 
countries. The Climate Insurance Pool would be reinsured against years of extreme loss in 
the global reinsurance market. The April 2009 submission of the MCII costed its proposal at 
US$10 billion per year. 
 
 
Figure 4: The MCII Proposal (reproduced from Warner et al. 2009b). 
 
 
                                                 
23
 See review paper by Warner and Spiegel (2008). 
24
 AOSIS (2008); MCII (2008); MCII (2009); Warner et al. (2009a,b). 
                                                                                         
The Proposal of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) 
The AOSIS proposal (Figure 5) calls for a multi-window mechanism with three components 
(or pillars) to address loss and damage from climate change impacts: insurance, 
rehabilitation, and risk management. The AOSIS proposal takes a similar form to the MCII 
proposal but with the additional pillar to deal with financial support for slow-onset loss 
events like sea level rise (the ‘Rehabilitation/Compensation Component’). The three pillars 
would be supported by a financial and technical support facility. 
 
Insurance 
Component
Rehabilitation/ 
Compensation 
Component
Risk Management 
Component
Address climate-related 
extreme weather events which 
result in loss and damage 
(cyclones, droughts, etc)
Address progressive negative 
impacts such as sea level rise, 
increasing land/sea temperatures 
that result in loss and damage 
(land loss, desertification, water 
availability etc.)
Promote risk assessment and risk 
management tools at all levels.
Facilitate implementation of risk 
management measures
Technical Advisory Facility
Financial Vehicle / Facility
 
Figure 5: The AOSIS Proposal (reproduced from AOSIS 2008). 
 
These proposals have been extensively discussed by Parties, experts and stakeholders. A 
number of open questions remain regarding the design and implementation of such 
mechanisms, as recorded for example by Iyahen and Young (2009) and MCII (2008; 2009b). 
These questions and others are outlined in Section V. 
 
IV. ’ELEMENTS‘ OF AN SBI WORK PROGRAMME ON LOSS AND DAMAGE 
 
As discussed in Section I, the UNFCCC requested that the SBI agree the activities to be 
undertaken under the work programme on loss and damage and called for the submissions 
of views from Parties and relevant organisations on what elements should be included. Our 
views on these elements, based upon the areas laid out in Paragraphs 28 and 29 of /CP.16, 
are summarised in Figure 6. 
 
                                                                                         
INPUTS ACTIVITIES OUTPUT OUTCOME
1. Mapping the risks 
from climate 
change and the 
assets exposed
2. Scoping the range 
of feasible 
measures and 
instruments 
available
3. Identifying 
approaches to 
operationalise 
packages of 
options
4. Understanding 
concerns of 
parties
3. Synthesize 
current evidence 
for each input
1. Engage relevant 
experts and 
stakeholders
2. Leverage parallel 
initiatives
4. Identify and 
prioritise 
knowledge gaps
5. Address high-
priority open 
questions most 
relevant to the 
outputs and 
outcomes
1. A menu of 
feasible packages 
of options, 
alongside 
practical 
implementation 
plans and high-
level cost 
estimates
2. Draft plan of 
actions to 
better refine 
options beyond 
the SBI work 
programme
Informing SBI 
recommendations 
on loss and damage 
to the 18th
Conference of 
Parties in 2012
 
Figure 6: Summary of suggested elements of an SBI work programme on loss and damage. The 
highlighted elements (in bold) are those that we suggest are highest priority in order to achieve the 
desired outcome, given the current state of the evidence related to loss and damage and Paragraphs 
28 and 29 of /CP.16. 
 
Outcomes and outputs 
 
First and foremost, the work programme should have a clearly defined desired outcome, or 
goal, from the start, and this should lead directly to a set of specific outputs. Paragraph 29 of 
the Cancún Adaptation Framework suggests one desired outcome from the work 
programme should be inform recommendations by the SBI on loss and damage to the 18th 
session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in late 2012.  
 
We suggest that in order to achieve this outcome, an output of the work programme should 
be to identify a menu of viable packages of tools (including measures, instruments and 
policies) and possible structures (institutional and otherwise) alongside outlines of 
practical implementation options and high-level cost estimates (where possible). 
 
A secondary output of the work programme could be a document identifying any remaining 
open questions, and a draft plan of how these could be answered in order to refine the 
menu of options, implementation plans and cost estimates after COP18. Such a plan could 
help to inform and catalyse future activities on loss and damage beyond the SBI work 
programme as well as building capacity for implementation. This plan could include, for 
example, options for pilot studies, strengthening local capacity and international 
cooperation on loss and damage, within both the research and policy-making communities, 
as well as within the private sector. 
 
 
                                                                                         
Inputs and Activities 
 
When a set of desired outputs is defined, it will be possible to identify the inputs and the 
activities required. Figure 7 summarises our suggested four inputs to the loss and damage 
programme. This is an area in which substantial expertise, experience and knowledge are 
already available and therefore, an initial activity of the work programme could be to 
synthesise this information then identifying and prioritising key gaps in current knowledge 
and experience (i.e. the inputs) that need to be filled in order to develop a menu of viable 
options and implementation plans to manage loss and damage. 
 
Mapping the risks from climate change and the assets exposed: 
Understanding the nature of the problem and gathering the technical risk 
information required to design response strategies
Scoping the range of measures and instruments available:
Identifying measures/instruments, their respective functions and their 
respective roles in a disaster risk management package
Identifying approaches to operationalize packages of options:
Mapping policy options, including their technical design issues and 
implementation and governance plans
INPUTS
Understand the concerns of parties:
Working with Parties and other stakeholders to understand their needs 
and concerns and incorporate them into the assessment of options
 
Figure 7: Suggested required inputs to the SBI work programme on loss and damage 
 
Evidence-gathering as part of the work programme should begin by engaging relevant 
stakeholders, Parties and experts. In particular, it is crucial that the packages of options and 
implementation plans reflect the needs of Parties and take into account their concerns, as 
well as being strongly founded on existing knowledge and experience of loss and damage 
mechanisms. This engagement could occur through a series of focused workshops and 
meetings. There is substantial work being undertaken that is relevant to loss and damage, 
such as the IPCC Special Report on Extreme Events and the UNISDR Global Assessment 
Report, so it will be important for the SBI to take account of these initiatives and leverage 
their resources and information appropriately. While this evidence-gathering will include 
scientific and technical considerations, we suggest that it should take place within the SBI 
work programme on loss and damage and should be focused on the development of 
practical recommendations for implementation.  
 
A next step would be to prioritise the gaps in current knowledge to inform the specification 
of outputs, based on input from the expert network. We suggest that the most significant 
gaps in current knowledge, and areas in which the greatest value can be added by the SBI in 
                                                                                         
in order to achieve the desired outcome, are related to approaches for operationalising 
packages of options; for example: 
1. Mapping the risks from climate change and the assets exposed: Much research 
attention has focused on understanding the nature of the problem, and parallel 
efforts by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and UN ISDR will 
provide further information on this by 2012. Important information gaps occur due 
to the lack of detailed risk assessments required to inform specific local response 
strategies. However, this is an intensive, locally-specific exercise that may be non-
essential to the development of broad recommendations about implementation, 
and may therefore be beyond the scope of the SBI work programme. Some have 
suggested that financing for such detailed risk assessments might form one 
component of a loss and damage mechanism25. 
2. Scoping the range of measures and instruments available: Substantial information 
and expertise is available about risk management tools, and, therefore, a valuable 
activity of the SBI, in the context of completing its defined outputs, might be to: 
i. Gather knowledge and assess the relative roles of different tools for 
managing climate change risks, given the core principles and lessons learnt 
from existing programmes. An output of this would be to develop the viable 
packages of measures for consideration (with cost estimates as 
appropriate). 
ii. Identify current gaps in knowledge, data and capacity (both local and global) 
for the implementation of these packages of options. 
iii. Catalyse an international expert network, leveraging complementary 
initiatives, to be later harnessed to refine and implement a loss and damage 
mechanism. 
3. Identifying approaches to operationalise packages of options: This input includes 
issues of design, implementation and governance of different packages of risk 
management options that need to be resolved in order to develop practical 
implementation plans. This input has so far received the least attention, but is an 
area in which many queries from Parties have been centred26. 
4. Understanding the concerns of Parties: Efforts have already been made to gain and 
synthesize these perspectives and address remaining questions22. Engaging Parties 
and other stakeholders to test the relevance of plans and gain buy-in should be a 
continuous activity of the SBI work programme on loss and damage. 
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 Such technical risk analyses could form a technical assistance component of a loss and damage 
mechanism, as has been proposed, e.g. MCII (2008); AOSIS (2008); and Warner and Spiegel (2009). 
26
 Iyahen and Young (2009); MCII (2008); and MCII (2009b). 
                                                                                         
Each input is important. Our assessment of current evidence is that information gaps 
relating to the third input could create the largest barrier to developing a set of viable 
recommendations for COP18. 
 
We suggest that addressing these gaps should be a priority activity for the SBI work 
programme on loss and damage. This could occur through a series of expert workshops, 
drawing on pools of expertise to address different components (e.g. technical design issues, 
international governance or local institutional arrangements) as necessary. Specific open 
questions related to this element are outlined in the following Section. 
 
Work Streams for Inputs and Activities 
 
The individual components of a loss and damage mechanism outlined in the Cancún 
Adaptation Framework have differing information needs and design, governance and 
implementation issues. To reflect this, we suggest that the inputs and activities of the work 
programme be divided along the lines of the different tools and levels of risk outlined in 
paragraph 28 of /CP.16: 
a. The development of a climate-insurance facility to address impacts related to 
severe weather events. That is, a facility to address infrequent, high impact risks of 
loss and damage from extreme events at a country level. 
b. Options for risk management, including risk sharing/transfer and risk reduction. 
This includes, for example, insurance and micro-insurance, resilience-building and 
economic diversification. This stream is focused on addressing more frequent and 
medium-scale risks of loss and damage at the country or regional level, compared 
with the first work stream. However, the risk reduction and resilience activities will 
also have benefits for managing the risks of the most severe weather events. 
c. Approaches to address longer-term foreseeable loss and damage: Approaches for 
addressing rehabilitation measures associated with gradual events, such as 
increasing mean temperatures, sea level rise, biodiversity loss, glacial retreat and 
desertification. 
These three work streams are not independent. It is important to examine the inter-
relationships between the different tools. The findings from the activities of each work 
stream should contribute to the overall menu of options (Figure 8). 
 
                                                                                         
INPUTS ACTIVITIES OUTPUT OUTCOME
a. A climate-insurance facility to 
address impacts related to 
severe weather events
b. Options for risk management, 
including risk sharing/transfer 
and risk reduction
c. Approaches to address longer-
term foreseeable loss and 
damage
1. A menu of 
feasible packages 
of options, 
alongside 
practical 
implementation 
plans and high-
level cost 
estimates
2. Draft plan of 
actions to 
better refine 
options beyond 
the SBI work 
programme
Informing SBI 
recommendations 
on loss and 
damage to the 18th
session of the 
Conference of the 
Parties in 2012
 
Figure 8: The three proposed work streams of inputs and activities. 
 
V. KEY OPEN QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE OPERATIONALIZING OPTIONS 
 
Given the knowledge available today, in the context of paragraphs 26-29 and the proposals 
already made by Parties outlined in Section III, we suggest the following open questions that 
could be addressed by the SBI work programme on loss and damage. The full list is given in 
the Technical Annex of this paper. Summarised below are those questions and issues which 
we suggest should have highest priority for investigation within the SBI work programme; 
where we define high priority questions and issues as those that could create barriers to the 
development of meaningful recommendations if not tackled ahead of COP18. The questions 
are divided by work stream, and are limited to the first two streams that address options for 
managing the risks from extreme weather events.  
 
We suggest that a first step of the work programme should be to scope a comprehensive 
and prioritised list of open questions in consultation with Parties, stakeholders and experts. 
 
a. Possible development of a climate-insurance facility to address impacts associated with 
severe weather events 
 
This work stream should focus on developing options for a ‘climate-insurance facility’ to 
manage damages associated with the most severe weather events; that is, those that would 
usually cause losses that go beyond the capacity of a country to cope. It would particularly 
explore the proposals made by Parties and Organisations (Section III) and consider specific 
feasibility, design and implementation questions. 
 
Unlike for work stream b., it is more difficult to identify an existing model for a climate-
insurance facility that exactly fits the descriptions provided by current proposals, and 
therefore, some innovation is likely to be required to design and implement this facility. 
                                                                                         
However, there are models that could be drawn upon to inform specific components, for 
example, the CCRIF and the European Union Solidarity Fund27. 
 
We suggest that high priority open questions and issues related to this work stream include: 
i. What should be the nature of the ‘climate-insurance facility’? For example, 
should it be designed to act as an international solidarity fund or a financial risk-
sharing instrument? How should solvency be ensured? 
ii. Which risks should be covered? For example, national, regional or local risks? 
Immediate liquidity gaps (as in the CCRIF) or public infrastructure damages also? 
Property damage or business interruption? What levels of losses should be 
covered? Should they include only risks from climate change or all climate risks? 
Which hazards should be covered28? Should the facility have scope to include non-
climate hazards, such as earthquakes? 
iii. Who should pay the premia? What fractions of premia should be contributed by 
the international community rather than beneficiary countries? How should any 
subsidies be structured - how should this vary depending on capacity of the 
beneficiary country and the level of coverage of the scheme? 
iv. What expertise and entities should be required to establish and run the facility? 
What would be realistic timescales for start-up and growth? 
v. What data, institutional, legal and expertise gaps would need to be filled to 
operationalize the facility? How should country level capacity issues be 
addressed? 
vi. How should the facility be established and grow? Should it begin with individual 
regional pools covering specific risks, with the aim of growing to a more global, 
comprehensive solution? 
vii. What public/private entities would need to be established to operate the facility 
and how should these interact with existing public institutions? Independent 
non-profit organisations, MLFAs or regional development banks? What 
international, regional and local institutions and bodies would need to be involved 
or established? How should operational entities be designed and what 
responsibilities should they have? 
viii. Would there be a role for the private sector? What would be the benefits of 
involving the private insurance and/or reinsurance industry to provide risk transfer 
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 The EU Solidarity Fund (EUSF), founded in 2004, provides assistance in the form of a single or global 
grant to member states when large-scale disasters occur. For further information: http://europa.eu/ 
legislation_summaries/regional_policy/provisions_and_instruments/g24217_en.htm. 
28
 Including a broader range of risks beyond climate hazards might have advantages for diversification 
of the risk pool, therefore reducing overall costs, but would pose a problem for the “polluter pays” 
principle as, for example, earthquakes are not influenced by greenhouse gas emissions. 
                                                                                         
or other services? How might public sector finance help leverage private sector 
contributions? 
ix. How should the facility be governed? Which institutions should be responsible? 
What auditing and verification processes would be required? 
x. Who should benefit? Which countries should be eligible to participate in the 
insurance facility? Should it be limited to least developed countries and the most 
vulnerable to climate change, or should there be broader participation, with 
premia based on financial capabilities or risk levels? How should the payouts of 
the facility be targeted to assist the most vulnerable people? 
xi. How should the facility promote risk reduction? For example, the MCII approach 
suggests that eligibility for the scheme should be linked to the performance of the 
individual states in complying with risk reduction measures. This would raise 
questions about how one should measure compliance and performance. 
b. Options for risk management and risk reduction; risk-sharing and transfer mechanisms 
such as insurance, including options for micro-insurance; and resilience-building, including 
economic diversification. 
 
The adaptation options addressed through this work stream should aim to manage medium-
scale or sub-national level loss and damage (e.g. Figure 1). This scale of risk can typically be 
cost-effectively reduced (or in some cases, eliminated) and residual risks shared or 
transferred. The types of measures required here would be similar to those used today to 
manage risks in both developed and developing countries and would be those already 
advocated by international development and disaster risk reduction organisations. This 
means that for this component, fewer knowledge gaps exist. However, implementation 
could be more challenging than for (a) as it is more likely to require ‘bottom-up’ actions and 
could therefore come up against barriers to action on the ground, such as institutional 
inertia and challenges through lack of local data and capacity. 
 
Investments and actions associated with this component would have strong synergies with 
other areas of adaptation financing (e.g. reducing risks from gradual changes in climate), as 
well as broader humanitarian, disaster risk reduction, development and poverty reduction 
activities that are not directly related to climate change. Examples include strengthening 
adaptive capacity, building risk information and early warning systems, addressing the 
underlying drivers of vulnerability (including economic diversification), strengthening 
institutional capacity and risk governance, and building financial safety nets. This means that 
investments will have immediate benefits in terms of loss reduction and ‘win-wins’ with 
other near-term non-climate priorities and development goals. 
 
                                                                                         
The proposals currently made as part of this element29 emphasize the need for local 
ownership and coordination, with international financing being directed towards technical 
assistance, local capacity-building (directed toward individuals, governments and the private 
sector) and funding of specific adaptation projects. In this context, high priority questions for 
the SBI work programme on loss and damage would include: 
 
i. How should a loss and damage mechanism be designed to support local capacity-
building? What types of knowledge and data gaps would need to be filled? For 
example, a technical assistance facility to help identify and fill gaps in present-day 
climate risk information and risk understanding, and to provide support for local 
capacity-building, including risk governance, finance distribution channels and the 
legal and regulatory frameworks to support insurance tools. 
ii. What local/international and public/private entities would need to be 
established? What international, regional and local institutions would need to be 
involved? How should operational entities be designed and what responsibilities 
should they have? 
iii. Would there be a role for the private sector? What would be the benefits of private 
sector involvement, such as insurance and reinsurance? How might public 
adaptation finance help leverage private sector contributions to address loss and 
damage, particularly risk reduction, risk transfer and technical assistance? 
iv. How should finance be targeted to assist the most vulnerable? 
v. Governance: how should the allocation of finance be governed? Who should pay? 
How should financing be organised (e.g. central pool vs. bilateral arrangements)? 
Should governance be centralised or disaggregated? How should adaptation finance 
be allocated between beneficiaries and projects? How should success be measured?  
vi. What should be the start-up procedure? What should be immediate priorities and 
how should initial actions be scaled up? What would be feasible timescales? 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
An outcome of the SBI work programme on loss and damage should be to inform 
recommendations to the 18th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC in late 
2012. To achieve this, we suggest an important output should be the development of a 
menu of viable measures, instruments and policies that could form part of a loss and 
damage mechanism, alongside an outline of approaches to implement these. There are 
several necessary inputs for such a menu of options. To date, research and evidence-
gathering efforts have focused on understanding the nature of the risks faced from climate 
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change and the potential damages. Proposals have been made for approaches to managing 
these risks, including risk reduction, risk transfer and resilience-building. An important gap is 
created by the lack of viable plans to operationalise these options, including their design, 
implementation and governance. A priority activity for the SBI work programme should be to 
draw together relevant expertise to explore the design and feasibility of proposals and sets 
of tools, given the needs of Parties, as well as to consider issues of implementation, 
operation and governance and how to put them into practice.  
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TECHNICAL ANNEX:  OPEN QUESTIONS ON THE DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF A LOSS AND DAMAGE 
MECHANISM 
 
 
(a) Possible development of a climate-insurance facility to address impacts associated with 
severe weather events 
 
Design/feasibility issues: 
i. What should be the nature of the ‘climate-insurance facility’? For example, should it 
be designed to act as an international solidarity fund or a financial risk sharing 
instrument? How should solvency be ensured? What should be the role of private 
versus public insurance/reinsurance providers? 
ii. What different types of ‘climate risk insurance’ exist and do they provide a useful 
and effective template or would it necessary to design and develop a new insurance 
facility? How should the insurance facility relate to existing insurance solutions? 
iii. Which risks should be covered? For example, national, regional or local risks? 
Immediate liquidity gaps (e.g. as in the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility, 
CCRIF) or public infrastructure damages also? Property damage or business 
interruption? What levels of losses should be covered? Should it include only risks 
from climate change or all climate risks30? Which hazards should be covered? Should 
the facility have scope to include non-climate hazards, such as earthquakes? 
iv. How should the insurance facility target assistance to the most vulnerable? 
v. Who should pay the premia? What fractions of premia should be contributed by the 
international community rather than beneficiary countries? How should any subsidies 
be structured - how should this vary depending on capacity of the beneficiary country 
and the level of coverage of the scheme? 
vi. How should the insurance facility be designed to complement other disaster risk 
management and adaptation activities? How should it operate alongside existing 
post-disaster aid, e.g. in the form of loans, donor aid or charities? 
vii. How should the facility promote risk reduction? For example, the MCII approach 
suggests that eligibility for the scheme should be linked to the performance of the 
individual states in complying with risk reduction measures. This would raise 
questions about how one should measure compliance and performance. 
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viii. How should the facility involve the private sector? For example, technical assistance, 
operational entities, capitalisation and/or reinsurance? How should initiatives be 
designed to avoid crowding out the private sector? Should there be scope for 
fostering private sector growth in developing countries (i.e. local insurers/service 
providers) or should this be mainly covered by large multi-national financial players? 
Should public financing be designed to leverage private sector expertise and finance? 
ix. How should the reserves of the facility be invested? Should these be invested in 
adaptation in developing countries? 
x. How should the facility relate to the other elements of the loss and damage 
mechanism? How should a macro facility relate to micro level facilities? Should it be 
the role of the central facilities to develop local facilities? How should it support these 
facilities? Should a facility also be used to manage long-term risks such as sea level 
rises? 
Technical design issues: 
i. How should contracts be designed? For example, should parametric triggers be used 
as with CCRIF, or should it be closer to traditional reinsurance? 
ii. Who should be the policy-holder/insured entity? 
iii. How should the facility be organised? For example, global or regional groupings? 
Global-level reinsurance initiatives to link regional pools? How many different cover 
layers? 
iv. Costs versus benefits: What levels of risk should be covered and at what cost? What 
levels of capitalization would be required? 
v. How should risks be assessed?  
Implementation: 
i. What expertise and entities would be required to establish the facility? What would 
be realistic timescales for start-up and growth? 
ii. What data, institutional, legal and expertise gaps would need to be filled to 
operationalize the facility? How should country level capacity issues be addressed? 
iii. How should the facility be established and grow? For example, should it begin with 
individual regional pools covering specific risks, with the aim of growing to a more 
global, comprehensive solution? 
Operation and governance: 
                                                                                         
i. What public/private entities would need to be established to operate the facility 
and how should these interact with existing public institutions? For example, 
independent non-profit organisations, MLFAs or regional development banks? What 
international, regional and local institutions would need to be involved? How should 
operational entities be designed and what responsibilities should they have? 
ii. How should be the facility be governed? Which institutions should be responsible? 
What auditing and verification processes would be required? Jurisdiction? How to 
manage conflicts? 
iii. Who should benefit? Which countries should be eligible to participate in the 
insurance facility? Should it be limited to LDCs or broader participation with premia 
based on capabilities? 
iv. Who should oversee and manage underwriting and claims? That is, risk selection 
process, risk assessment, premium setting and claims payout. How should the risk of 
political interference be reduced, and what should be the role of private market 
drivers. 
 
(b) Options for risk management and risk reduction; risk-sharing and transfer mechanisms 
such as insurance, including options for micro-insurance; and resilience building, including 
economic diversification 
 
Design issues: 
i. What risk reduction and risk transfer tools are currently available? What are the 
benefits and limitations of these tools and how should they work together? What are 
their requirements, in terms of finance and operation?  
ii. Do we need any new tools? 
iii. What should be achieved and at what cost? Where and how can adaptation finance 
have the greatest benefits? For example, global knowledge and data, versus specific 
local adaptation projects? 
iv. What would be the appropriate balance between near-term risk transfer and short-
term/long-term risk reduction activities? How should risk transfer tools be designed 
to incentivise long-term risk reduction? 
v. What forms of risk transfer would be appropriate? Who should be insured 
(individuals, communities and/or governments)? What should be insured? How 
should affordability ensured? How should risk transfer tools, like micro-insurance, be 
                                                                                         
designed to promote risk reduction and long-term adaptation? What should be learnt 
from existing schemes in both developed and developing countries? What designs of 
risk transfer tools would be appropriate? Should risk transfer tools be delivered by the 
public sector, private-public organisations, or the private sector? How should the 
residual risks be managed? How should moral hazard be avoided? 
vi. What should be the role of the private sector? How should public finance leverage 
private finance and expertise? How should initiatives be designed to incentivise rather 
than crowd-out the private sector? Role of local markets versus global players? 
Implementation: 
i. What knowledge, data and local capacity gaps would need to be filled for 
implementation and how might this be achieved? For example, gaps in local risk 
governance capacity, present-day climate risk information and risk understanding, 
distribution channels and regulation needs of insurance. 
ii. Should there be one ‘official’ risk assessment and risk data source? How should this 
data be generated, managed and disseminated? 
iii. How should loss and damage projects work alongside, leverage and support existing 
national or international initiatives to protect vulnerable populations, as well as 
local broader development needs? For example, the UNISDR and Hyogo Framework, 
national development activities and the NAPAs. 
iv. What would be a good set of principles for implementing programmes? 
v. What should be the start-up procedure? What should be immediate priorities and 
how should initial actions be scaled up? What would be feasible timescales? 
Operation and governance: 
i. What public/private entities would need to be established? What international, 
regional and local institutions would need to be involved? How should operational 
entities be designed and what responsibilities should they have? 
ii. Should there be a role for the private sector? What would be the benefits of involving 
the private sector, such as insurance and reinsurance? How might public adaptation 
finance help leverage private sector contributions to addressing loss and damage in 
this context; related to risk reduction, risk transfer and technical assistance? 
iii. How should finance be targeted to assist the most vulnerable? 
iv. Governance: How should the allocation of finance be governed? Who should pay? 
How should financing be organised (e.g. central pool vs. bilateral arrangements)? 
                                                                                         
Should governance be centralised or disaggregated? How should adaptation finance 
be allocated between beneficiaries and projects? How should success be measured? 
v. Should risk transfer instruments be centrally or locally operated and governed? 
What international facilities should be involved? For example, should central bodies 
be involved for technical assistance, reinsurance and/or providing insurance? 
 
